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Tracking cryptic SARS-CoV-2 lineages detected
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Tracking SARS-CoV-2 genetic diversity is strongly indicated because diversifying selection
may lead to the emergence of novel variants resistant to naturally acquired or vaccineinduced immunity. To monitor New York City (NYC) for the presence of novel variants, we
deep sequence most of the receptor binding domain coding sequence of the S protein of
SARS-CoV-2 isolated from the New York City wastewater. Here we report detecting
increasing frequencies of novel cryptic SARS-CoV-2 lineages not recognized in GISAID’s
EpiCoV database. These lineages contain mutations that had been rarely observed in clinical
samples, including Q493K, Q498Y, E484A, and T572N and share many mutations with the
Omicron variant of concern. Some of these mutations expand the tropism of SARS-CoV-2
pseudoviruses by allowing infection of cells expressing the human, mouse, or rat ACE2
receptor. Finally, pseudoviruses containing the spike amino acid sequence of these lineages
were resistant to different classes of receptor binding domain neutralizing monoclonal
antibodies. We offer several hypotheses for the anomalous presence of these lineages,
including the possibility that these lineages are derived from unsampled human COVID-19
infections or that they indicate the presence of a non-human animal reservoir.
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ARS-CoV-2 is shed in feces and can be detected by RT-qPCR
in wastewater correlating to caseloads in sewersheds1–3.
Consequently, municipalities and public health organizations
have employed wastewater surveillance as a public health tool to
make informed decisions about COVID-19 interventions2,4. However, the standard application of RT-qPCR does not provide genotype information and consequently cannot be used to monitor
SARS-CoV-2 evolution and track variants of concern. Some
researchers have applied, with mixed success, high-throughput
sequencing strategies to total RNA extracted from wastewater.
Often, coverage across the SARS-CoV-2 genome is uneven and
epidemiologically informative regions can have low coverage5,6.
Additionally, because wastewater samples contain an amalgamation
of lineages circulating in the sewershed, it is not possible to
reconstruct individual genomes using standard methods. Because
of these difﬁculties, some researchers are using a strategy that
employs the ampliﬁcation and sequencing of small, speciﬁc regions
of the SARS-CoV-2 genome, i.e., targeted sequencing7,8. Targeted
sequencing can provide high coverage of epidemiologically informative regions of the genome and importantly, can reveal which
polymorphisms are linked, thus allowing SARS-CoV-2 variants of
concern (VOC) in communities to be tracked.
Since January of 2021, we sequenced SARS-CoV-2 RNA isolated from the raw inﬂuent from all 14 NYC WWTPs approximately twice per month7. Initially, we used an iSeq instrument to
sequence a PCR-ampliﬁed region of the SARS-CoV-2 spike
protein gene. This region spanned spike protein amino acid

residues 434–505, which includes the receptor binding domain
(RBD) (Fig. 1A). Beginning in April 2021, we switched to using a
MiSeq instrument, which allowed us to sequence a larger
amplicon that included amino acid residues 412–579. While no
samples were analyzed with both the iSeq and MiSeq, the same
constellations of mutations were consistently observed in the
respective sewersheds regardless of the instrument used. These
regions contain loci that are signiﬁcant in SARS-CoV-2 receptor
tropism and immune evasion, and contain multiple polymorphisms found in many VOCs9,10.
Results and discussion
Identiﬁcation of novel cryptic sewershed-speciﬁc lineages. Our
analysis pipeline, which uses the tool SAM Reﬁner to report
polymorphisms and remove artiﬁcial chimeric sequences, allowed
us to determine the frequency of each polymorphism and more
importantly, elucidate which polymorphisms were derived from
the same RNA sequence8. Freebayes and IGV were used to
validate the reported polymorphisms (see “Methods” section).
Using this approach, we were able to classify suites of mutations
found in the RBD amplicons as consistent with Pango lineages
B.1.1.7 (Alpha), B.1.351 (Beta), B.1.427/429 (Epsilon), B.1.526
(Iota), B.1.617 (Delta and Kappa), and P.1 (Gamma). Importantly, the distributions and trends in viral lineages from wastewater were consistent with patient derived sequences from NYC
submitted to the GISAID EpiCoV database (hereafter, GISAID;

Fig. 1 Novel SARS-CoV-2 lineages from wastewater. A Schematic of SARS-CoV-2 and the ampliﬁcation locations. B Distribution of SARS-COV-2 variants
based on patient sequences (patient data obtained from GISAID) and wastewater surveillance. Polymorphisms detected from amplicon sequencing that
were used to assign sequences to lineages are shown in the legend. The variants detected from the 14 NYC WWTPs were weighted by ﬂowrate to
generate a city-wide average distribution. C Novel lineages detected from WWTPs. Schematic highlights shared sequences identiﬁed from WWTP 10, 11,
and 3 are shown. The percent of the sequences from each date that contained the indicated polymorphisms is shown below each lineage. The viral copies/
L corresponding to each date are shown in Supplementary Table 3. Some sequences have additional polymorphisms not listed. WNY lineage designations
are shown for sequences used for tropism and antibody neutralization analysis. Source data are provided as a Source Data ﬁle.
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https://www.gisaid.org/) (Fig. 1B and Supplementary Data 1 and
Supplementary Fig. 1). For example, between February and April,
wastewater and patient sequencing both revealed a notable
increase in sequences assigned to the Alpha lineage and a corresponding decrease in sequences that did not belong to any of
the VOC lineages.
In addition to well-recognized lineages, WWTPs 3, 10, and 11
contained RBD sequences with consistent constellations of
polymorphisms detected over several months that did not match
lineages reported in GISAID (Fig. 1C). Herein we refer to these
constellations of linked mutations in the RBD sequences as
lineages (meaning that they are of common descent), although
without having the complete genome sequence we cannot say
whether these were derived from a single lineage or multiple
lineages with the same RBD sequence. These cryptic lineages were
not static, as several of them appeared to acquire additional
polymorphisms over the period of sampling. For example, one of
the lineages from WWTF 10 added the polymorphism F486P at
later sampling dates (Fig. 1C).
The cryptic lineages all remained relatively geographically
constrained. The lineages from WWTP 3 and WWTP 10 were
only observed from those locations during this sampling period.
Sequences resembling the lineages from WWTP 11 were occasionally seen in neighboring sewersheds. Four of the anomalous lineages,
designated WNY1, WNY2, WNY3, and WNY4, were selected for
further study. Each of these lineages contained at least ﬁve
polymorphisms; the most divergent was WNY4, which contained
16 amino acid changes in its RBD including a deletion at position
484. We note that WNY4 and the Omicron VOC possess mutations
at the overlapping residues in the RBD, including K417, S477, T478,
E484, G496, Q498, N501, and Y505. Polymorphisms at several of
these positions have been reported to evade neutralization by
particular antibodies9,11–14.
Interestingly, all four WNY lineages contained a polymorphism at spike protein residue 498 (Q498H or Q498Y). As of
November 30, 2021, there were only 35 SARS-CoV-2 sequences
in GISAID that contained the polymorphism Q498H (eight in the
USA), and none that contained Q498Y. However, both of these
polymorphisms have been associated with host range expansion
of SARS-CoV-2 into rodents15–17, which are generally resistant to
the parent SARS-CoV-2 lineage18–20. Notably, as the concentration of SARS-CoV-2 genetic material from NYC wastewater
decreased along with the decrease in COVID patients, the
fraction of the total sequences from these lineages has
proportionally increased (Fig. 1C and Supplementary Fig. 1). By
May and June, these lineages often represented the majority of
sequences recovered from some sewersheds. For instance, on June
7 the sequences recovered from WWTF10 were predominantly
composed of two variant lineages comprising 48 and 49% of the
total sequences (Fig. 1C). By May, when cases were dramatically
dropping, several of the NYC sewersheds did not contain high
enough concentrations of SARS-CoV-2 RNA for analysis, which
prevented further determination of city-wide variant distributions
from wastewater.
As an external conﬁrmation of our ﬁndings, we analyzed raw
reads uploaded by September 15, 2021 to NCBI’s Sequence Read
Archive (SRA) from nearly 5000 other wastewater samples
globally spanning 2020–2021, including 172 samples from
New York state. Of all samples, only 7, all from NY state
sewersheds, had sequences resembling the lineages we described
(SRA Accessions: SRR15202279, SRR15384049, SRR15291304,
SRR15128978, SRR15128983, SRR15202284, and SRR15202285).
Are cryptic lineages derived from unsampled COVID-19
infections? The existence of these cryptic lineages may point to
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COVID-19 infections of human patients that are not being
sampled through standard clinical sequencing efforts. The frequency of weekly conﬁrmed cases in NYC that were sequenced
ranged from 2.6% on January 31, 2021 to 12.9% on June 12, 2021
(https://github.com/nychealth/coronavirus-data/blob/master/
variants/cases-sequenced.csv). Nonetheless, not all cases were
diagnosed and not all positive samples were sequenced. Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that the WNY lineages may be derived
from patients, who are not being sampled in clinical settings.
Alternatively, these cryptic lineages may be derived from
physically distinct locations in the body. That is, perhaps
viruses of these lineages predominantly replicate in gut
epithelial cells and are not present in the nasopharynx such
that standard swabbing techniques can recover sufﬁcient
quantities for sequencing. Finally, we speculate that perhaps
these mutations are found in minority variants that are
unreported in consensus sequences uploaded to EpiCoV and
other databases. Several groups have identiﬁed evidence of
within host quasispecies in NGS datasets21,22. In one case, as
many as 68% of the samples contained evidence of quasispecies
in several loci, 76% of which contained nonsynonymous
mutations concentrated in the S and orf1a genes21. To address
whether our variants were associated with within-host diversity,
we checked for minority variants in the raw reads of sequencing
runs performed on samples collected between January 2020 to
July 2021 obtained from NY state COVID-19 patients uploaded
to the SRA. Of the 7309 samples publicly available as of July 21,
2021, none had sequences that matched the WNY lineages.
Some sequences from these SRAs had subsets of mutations
associated with the WNY lineages, but never a full suite or at a
high frequency.
Arguing against the possibility of unsampled human strains is
the geographical stratiﬁcation of these cryptic lineages. Since
January 2021, the lineages have remained geographically
constrained over many months in the sewersheds we sampled,
which is not consistent with a contagious human pathogen.
While there were some COVID-19 related restrictions in NYC
(e.g., restaurants operated at 50% capacity), movement was
generally not restricted during the study period. Public
transportation was operating in a normal capacity. Furthermore,
our group regularly processes wastewater samples from over 100
locations and have never seen this kind of geographic constraint
of a SARS-CoV-2 lineage that coincides with veriﬁed patient
sequences. We suspect this lack of dispersal is consistent with
infections of non-human animals with restricted movements or
home ranges, but note that it could also be associated with
patients conﬁned to long-term healthcare facilities (e.g., nursing
homes, hospices).
Do cryptic lineages indicate presence of SARS-COV-2 animal
reservoirs? Another hypothesis is that these cryptic lineages are
derived from SARS-CoV-2 animal reservoirs. To date, there have
been a number of animals infected by SARS-CoV-2, including
mink23, lions and tigers24, and cats and dogs25,26. To gain insight
into the possible host range of these lineages, synthetic DNA
coding for the amino acid sequences for these four lineages were
generated and introduced into a SARS-CoV-2 spike expression
construct for functional analysis (Fig. 2). All four of these lineages
were found to be fully functional and produced transductioncompetent lentiviral pseudoviruses with titers similar to the
parent strain (D614G). To determine if these pseudoviruses displayed an expanded receptor tropism, stable cell lines expressing
Human, Mouse, or Rat ACE2 were cultured with the pseudoviruses (Fig. 2). While the parent SARS-CoV-2 spike pseudoviruses could only transduce cells with human ACE2, all four of
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Fig. 2 ACE2 usage by WNY lineages. A Schematic of lineages and pseudovirion production. WNY1 = E484A/F486P/S494P/Q498Y/H519N/F572N,
WNY2 = Q493K/S494P/Q498Y/H519N/T572N, WNY3 = K417T/K444T/E484A/F590Y/Q498H, WNY4 = K417T/N439K/K444N/Y449R/L452R/
N460K/S477N/Δ484/F486V/S494T/G496V/Q498Y/N501T/G504D/505H/H519Q. The indicated mutations were introduced into a codon-optimized
SARS-COV-2 expression construct. These constructs were used to produce lentiviral pseudovirions containing a Gaussia luciferase reporter. Pseudoviruses
containing SARS-COV-2 Spike with N501Y/A570D were used as a control as this is known to be capable of infecting rodent cells. Pseudoviruses were
used to transduce 293FT+TMRPSS2 stably transduced with human, mouse, or rat ACE2. The average and standard deviation from three independent
experiments is shown. A two-way ANOVA revealed signiﬁcant differences in receptor utilization (F = 17.81, DF = 3, 74; P < 0.0001). Source data are
provided as a Source Data ﬁle.

the lineages could efﬁciently transduce cells with the human,
mouse, and rat ACE2. Because some patient-derived SARS-CoV2 lineages, such as Beta and Gamma, have also gained the ability
to infect rodent cells (Fig. 2, N501Y+A570D), this observation
cannot be taken as evidence that these lineages were derived from
such a host27. Nonetheless, the observation is consistent with the
possibility that these lineages are derived from an animal host
such as a rodent.
If such reservoirs exist, the animal host would need to meet
several criteria. First, the host species would need to be present in
the sewershed. Second, the number of susceptible animals present
must be high enough to sustain an epidemic for at least six
months (i.e., the period for which we observe these sequences).
Third, host animals must not disperse beyond the geographical
locations where the sequences are found. Finally, there must be a
route for shed viruses to enter the sewersheds where the lineages
are seen.
We considered several mammalian species known to inhabit
NYC that may meet these criteria, including bats (several species),
cats (Felis catus), dogs (Canis familiaris), gray squirrels (Sciurus
carolinensis), mice (Mus musculus or Peromyscus leucopus),
opossums (Didelphis virginiana), rabbits (Sylvilagus ﬂoridanus),
raccoons (Procyon lotor), rats (Rattus norvegicus), and skunks
(Mephitis mephitis). To narrow our search, we reasoned that if
viruses are being shed from one of these animals, then we should
be able to detect rRNA from the animal in the sewershed as well.
4

Mammalian species detected in wastewater. We extracted total
RNA from wastewater samples obtained on two different dates
from sewersheds where the WNY lineages were observed. This
RNA was PCR ampliﬁed with 12S rRNA primers (Supplementary
Table 1) and deep sequenced. Sequences mapping to mammalian
rRNA were observed in all samples (Table 1). In all cases, the
majority of the rRNA sequences mapped to human rRNA. Several
species, such as cow, pig, and sheep, were identiﬁed that are not
indigenous to NYC. These detects are likely derived from food
consumption so are ruled out as possible hosts. After nonindigenous mammals were removed, four remaining mammalian
species were repeatedly detected: humans, cats, dogs, and rats
(Table 1).
Cats and dogs are susceptible to SARS-CoV-228,29, and cats are
able to transmit to other animals26. Many rodents are not
permissive for infection by the canonical SARS-CoV-2 strain20,30,
but some variants have an expanded tropism that includes
mice27. A 2013 census estimated that there are 576,000 pet cats in
NYC households31, but this estimate does not include stray cats.
Extrapolating from a limited study conducted in 2017 implies a
stray cat population of about 2500 animals32, but this number
does not accord with the approximately 18,000 animals received
annually by NYC Animal Care Centers31. There are currently
345,727 active dog licenses in NYC33, but this ﬁgure is likely a
signiﬁcant underestimate and the true number may be at least
double this ﬁgure. Despite these uncertainties, both cat and dog
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Table 1 Predominant species detected in NYC wastewater via deep sequencing of 12S amplicons.
Genus

Common name

WWTP 3 6-7/6-28

WWTP 10 6-7/6-28

WWTP 11 6-7/6-28

Homo
Bos
Sus
Rattus
Canis
Felis
Ovis

Human
Cow
Pig
Rat
Dog
Cat
Sheep

M/M
++/+++
+++/+++
+++/+++
++/++
++/++
+/−

M/M
++/++
+++/+++
+/−
+++/+++
++/+
+/−

M/M
++/++
+++/+++
++/++
++/+
+/−
+/−

Results from samples obtained on June 7 and June 28 are shown. The fraction of the total sequences detected are denoted as follows: Majority >50% (M), >1% (+++), >0.1% (++), <0.1% (+), not
detected (−).

populations are dwarfed by the NYC rat population, which is
estimated to number between 2–8 million animals34.
WWTP 10 wastewater contained cat, rat, and dog rRNA, but
rat rRNA reads were less than 0.1% of total reads and were only
detected on one of the two dates tested (Table 1). This low
detection was expected because the WWTP 10 sewershed is not a
combined system (i.e., stormwater generally does not mix with
wastewater). Moreover, the sewershed serves a suburban
residential area and is believed to have one of the lowest rat
densities in the city based on the volume of rat complaints
received by city services (https://data.cityofnewyork.us/SocialServices/Rats-Heat-Map/g642-4e55). WWTP 3 and 11 wastewater also contained cat, rat, and dog rRNA, though the
composition varied. In WWTP 3 wastewater, rat rRNA was the
most prevalent after humans, representing over 1% of the total
rRNA reads (Table 1). In WWTP 11, rat and dog rRNA were
both above 0.1% of reads, but cat rRNA reads were less than 0.1%
of total reads and were only detected on one of two dates tested
(Table 1). All of these numbers are eclipsed by the overwhelming
prevalence of human rRNA in the same samples. As no animal
rRNAs are highly prevalent in all three sewersheds, it is difﬁcult
to reconcile a single animal being the reservoir for all cryptic
lineages in NYC wastewater.
Cryptic lineages detected from wastewater are resistant to some
neutralizing antibodies. In addition to polymorphisms from the
cryptic lineages that are known to affect viral tropism, many of
the polymorphisms are also known to affect antibody evasion.
In particular, the WNY polymorphisms at positions K417,
N439, N440, K444, L452, N460, E484, Q493, S494, and N501
have all been reported to evade neutralization by particular
antibodies9,11–14. Most neutralizing antibodies against SARSCoV-2 target the RBD of the spike protein, and most of these
neutralizing antibodies are divided into three classes based on
binding characteristics35.
To test if the cryptic lineages have gained resistance to
neutralizing antibodies, we obtained three clinically approved
neutralizing monoclonal antibodies representing these 3 classes,
LY-CoV016 (etesevimab, Class 1)36, LY-CoV555 (bamlanivimab,
Class 2)37, and REGN10987 (imdevimab, Class 3)38, and tested
their ability to neutralize the cryptic lineages. All four of the
lineages displayed complete resistance to LY-CoV555, despite the
parent lineage remaining potently sensitive to this antibody
(Fig. 3). WNY1 and WNY2 remained at least partially sensitive to
LY-CoV016 and REGN10987, but WNY3 and WNY4 appeared
to be completely resistant to all three neutralizing antibodies
(Fig. 3).
Finally, we tested the ability of plasma from fully vaccinated
individuals (Pﬁzer) or patients previously infected with SARSCoV-2 to neutralize WNY3 and WNY4. All patients’ plasma
retained some capacity to neutralize these pseudoviruses (Fig. 3).

However, previously infected patients had an average 2-fold and
6.4-fold reduction in ID50 (WT vs. variant) with WNY3 and
WNY4, respectively. Vaccinated patient plasma did not have a
statically signiﬁcant reduction with WNY3 but had an average
2.9-fold reduction with WNY4. It must be noted that neutralizing
antibody activity from vaccinated individuals is not solely
directed against the spike RBD. Therefore, if the full spike
proteins from these cryptic lineages with the additional mutations
they carry were tested, the neutralization capacity could be
enhanced or further diminished. Thus, the characteristics of these
lineages provide them the capacity to be a potential increased
threat to human health.
Challenges. While we believe that our data, analysis, and interpretation of our ﬁndings warrant sharing with the scientiﬁc
community, we recognize that our study has several limitations.
The source of the novel lineages has not been identiﬁed. Investigations are ongoing to test possible animal reservoirs from these
sewershed and to better pinpoint the geographical source of the
cryptic variants by sequencing RNA from wastewater obtained
upstream from our WWTPs of interest.
It is also recognized that the targeted sequencing approach does
not identify mutations outside of the targeted region. In some cases,
whole genome sequencing of wastewater has been employed, but
the results have been ambiguous. Typical whole genome sequencing
relies on ampliﬁcation and subsequent computational assembly of
genomes from overlapping 150–300 bp reads. When an infected
individual’s sample is sequenced, mutations appearing in different
reads are assumed to be linked given that the reads likely come
from a single virus genotype. By contrast, wastewater generally
contains virions shed from numerous infected individuals, mutations identiﬁed cannot be reliably assigned to a speciﬁc genome39.
To date it has not been possible to isolate viable virus from
wastewater such that single virus genotypes can be sequenced40.
Therefore, we cannot link mutations unless they are found on the
same amplicon.
A further challenge is that the depth of coverage across the
SARS-CoV-2 genomes sequenced from wastewater tends to be
uneven. As such, phylogenetically and clinically important
regions of the genome may fail to be adequately sequenced at
appropriate levels of coverage. We chose to focus on a region of
the spike RBD because of the prevalence of mutations that are
phylogenetically and clinically important. We can reliably
sequence this amplicon with high coverage.
To address the limitations presented by targeting just a small
region of the SARS-CoV-2 spike, we are incorporating targeted
sequencing of other variable regions of interest in the genome,
particularly those regions that contain mutations unique to
speciﬁc variants of concern. In addition, we are PCR amplifying,
cloning, and sequencing a 1.5 kb region of the spike protein gene
to conﬁrm the linkage of mutations of interest.
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LY-CoV016 (Class 1)

LY-CoV555 (Class 2)

REGN10987 (Class 3)

WNY1
WNY2
WNY3
WNY4
Parent (D614G)

**p<0.01, ***p<0.001, Wilcoxon matched pairs test
Fig. 3 Antibody resistance to monoclonal neutralizing antibodies and patient plasma. Lentiviral reporter pseudoviruses containing Gaussia luciferase
were generated with parent (D614G), WNY1, WNY2, WNY3, or WNY4 Spike proteins. These pseudoviruses were treated with 2-fold dilutions of indicated
monoclonal neutralizing antibody or patient serum and used to infect 293FT+TMPRSS2+human ACE2. Gaussia luciferase levels were quantitated
approximately 2–3 days of post-transduction. Representative examples of three experiments with monoclonal antibodies performed in triplicate are shown.
Infection was normalized to the wells infected with pseudovirus alone. Patient plasma Neutralization IC50 titers were calculated using nonlinear regression
(Inhibitor vs. normalized response—variable slope) in GraphPad Prism 9.0. The number indicates the mean fold of reduction in IC50 and SD. Wilcoxon
matched-pairs signed rank tests, a two-tailed test, were performed for paired comparisons with signiﬁcance levels as follows: WNY3 patient p = 0.0049,
WNY4 patient p = 0.001, and WNY4 vaccinated = 0.0068. Source data are provided as a Source Data ﬁle.

Table 2 Demographic information for participants in
antibody neutralization study.

Total
Age
Gender
Vaccine type

Number
Average (Years)
Range (Years)
Male
Female

COVID-19 patients

Vaccinated

12
39
19–64
1
11
–

12
51
24–65
3
9
Pﬁzer

Summary. To date, most data on SARS-CoV-2 genetic diversity
has come from the sequencing of clinical samples, but such studies may suffer limitations due to biases, costs, and throughput.
Here, we demonstrate the circulation of several cryptic lineages
of SARS-CoV-2 in the NYC metropolitan area that have not
been detected by standard clinical surveillance. While the origins
of these cryptic lineages have not been determined, we have
demonstrated that they have expanded receptor tropism which is
consistent with expansion to an animal reservoir. Other SARSCoV-2 animal reservoirs have been identiﬁed23,41. However, no
single animal was strongly represented in all our rRNA sequencing analysis, which raises doubts that a single animal reservoir is
the source of all the cryptic lineages.
Finally, we demonstrated that these cryptic lineages have
gained signiﬁcant resistance to some patient-derived neutralizing
monoclonal antibodies. We note especially the high number of
shared loci mutated in both our WNY lineages and the Omicron
VOC. It’s possible that these shared mutated loci are a product of
convergent evolution to the shared selective pressure of antibodymediated neutralization. Thus, these cryptic lineages could be
relevant to public health and necessitate further study.
6

Methods
Ethics statement. All procedures performed in studies involving human participants, including blood collection and processing, were approved by The Institutional Review Board of the University of Missouri (protocols #2043082 and
230262). Written consent was received from all human subjects prior to being
enrolled in the study. The cohort of participants were selected based on equivalent
levels of antibodies to SARS-CoV-2 RBD, age, or gender did not contribute to
differences between samples (Table 2). COVID+ participants were collected prior
to Dec 11, 2020 and did not receive a COVID vaccine. Vaccinated individuals were
vaccinated with Pﬁzer and have not had a previous PCR+ COVID test. Patients
were compensated $10/draw.
Wastewater sample processing and RNA extraction. Wastewater (24 h composite samples) was collected from the inﬂow at 14 NYC wastewater treatment
plants and RNA isolated according to our previously published protocol2. While
samples have been obtained and processed on a weekly basis since June 2020, we
report herein the outcome of sequencing runs performed approximately every
2 weeks between January and June 2021. The speciﬁc dates of sampling were
January 31st, February 28th, March 14th, April 5th, April 19th, May 10th, May
26th, June 7th, June 14th, and June 28th.
Brieﬂy, 250 mL from 24 h composite raw sewage samples obtained from NYC
WWTPs were centrifuged at 5000 × g for 10 min at 4 °C to pellet solids. Forty
milliliter of supernatant was passed through a 0.22 μM ﬁlter (Millipore,
SLGPR33R). Filtrate was stored at 4 °C for 24 h after adding 0.9 g sodium chloride
(Fisher Scientiﬁc, BP358-10) and 4.0 g PEG 8000 (Fisher Scientiﬁc, BP233-1) then
centrifuged at 12,000 × g for 120 minutes at 4 °C to pellet the precipitate. The pellet
was resuspended in 1.5 mL TRIzol (Fisher Scientiﬁc,15596026), and RNA was
puriﬁed according to the manufacturer’s instructions.
Targeted PCR: iSeq sequencing. RNA isolated from wastewater was used to
generate cDNA using ProtoScript® II Reverse Transcriptase kit (New England
Biolabs, M0368S). The RNA was incubated with an RBD speciﬁc primer (ccagatgattttacaggctgcg, Genewiz) and dNTPs (0.5 mM ﬁnal concentration, included in
the kit) at 65 °C for 5 min and placed on ice. The RT buffer, DTT (0.01 M ﬁnal
concentration, included in the kit), and the RT were added to the same tube and
incubated at 42 °C for 2 h followed by 20 min at 65 °C to inactivate the enzyme.
The RBD region was ampliﬁed using Q5® High-Fidelity DNA Polymerase (New
England Biolabs, M0491S) using primers that incorporate Illumina adapters (see
Supplementary Table 2). PCR performed as follows: 98 °C (0:30) + 40 cycles of
[98 °C (0:05) + 53 °C (0:15) + 65 °C (1:00)] × 40 cycles + 65 °C (1:00).

NATURE COMMUNICATIONS | (2022)13:635 | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-022-28246-3 | www.nature.com/naturecommunications

NATURE COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-022-28246-3

The RBD amplicons were puriﬁed using AMPure XP beads (Beckman Coulter,
A63881). Index PCR was performed using the Nextera DNA CD Indexes kit
(Illumina, 20018707) with 2× KAPA HiFi HotStart ReadyMix (Roche, KK2601),
and indexed PCR products puriﬁed using AMPure beads (Beckman Coulter,
A63881). The indexed libraries were quantiﬁed using the Qubit 3.0 and Qubit
dsDNA HS Assay Kit (Invitrogen, Q32854) and diluted in 10 mM Tris-HCl to a
ﬁnal concentration of approximately 0.3 ng/μL (1 nM). The libraries were pooled
together and diluted to a ﬁnal concentration of 50 pM. Before sequencing on an
Illumina iSeq100, a 10% spike-in of 50 pM PhiX control v3 (Illumina, FC-1103001) was added to the pooled library. The Illumina iSeq instrument was used to
generate paired-end 150 base pair length reads.
Targeted PCR: MiSeq sequencing. The primary RBD RT-PCR was performed
using the Superscript IV One-Step RT-PCR System (Thermo Fisher Scientiﬁc,12594100). Primary RT-PCR ampliﬁcation was performed as follows: 25 °C
(2:00) + 50 °C (20:00) + 95 °C (2:00) + [95 °C (0:15) + 55 °C (0:30) + 72 °C
(1:00)] × 25 cycles using the MiSeq primary PCR primers (Supplementary
Table 1). Secondary PCR (25 µL) was performed on RBD ampliﬁcations using 5 µL
of the primary PCR as template with MiSeq nested gene speciﬁc primers containing 5′ adapter sequences (Supplementary Table 1) (0.5 µM each), dNTPs
(100 µM each) (New England Biolabs, N0447L) and Q5 DNA polymerase (New
England Biolabs, M0541S). Secondary PCR ampliﬁcation was performed as follows: 95 °C (2:00) + [95 °C (0:15) + 55 °C (0:30) + 72 °C (1:00)] × 20 cycles. A
tertiary PCR (50 µL) was performed to add adapter sequences required for Illumina cluster generation with forward and reverse primers (0.2 µM each), dNTPs
(200 µM each) (New England Biolabs, N0447L) and Phusion High-Fidelity DNA
Polymerase (1U) (New England Biolabs, M0530L). PCR ampliﬁcation was performed as follows: 98 °C (3:00) + [98 °C (0:15) + 50 °C (0:30) + 72 °C (0:30)] × 7
cycles +72 °C (7:00). Ampliﬁed product (10 µl) from each PCR reaction is
combined and thoroughly mixed to make a single pool. Pooled amplicons were
puriﬁed by addition of Axygen AxyPrep MagPCR Clean-up beads (Axygen, MAGPCR-CL-50) in a 1.0 ratio to purify ﬁnal amplicons. The ﬁnal amplicon library
pool was evaluated using the Agilent Fragment Analyzer automated electrophoresis system, quantiﬁed using the Qubit HS dsDNA assay (Invitrogen), and
diluted according to Illumina’s standard protocol. The Illumina MiSeq instrument
was used to generate paired-end 300 base pair length reads. Adapter sequences
were trimmed from output sequences using cutadapt.
Wastewater rRNA sequencing. cDNA from wastewater was also used to generate
libraries using the primers indicated in Supplementary Table 1. rRNA Libraries
were ampliﬁed using ProtoScript® II Reverse Transcriptase (New England Biolabs,
M0368S) and pooled and sequenced on the iSeq100 as described above.
Bioinformatics. iSeq reads were uploaded to the BaseSpace Sequence Hub and
demultiplexed using a FASTQ generation script. Reads were processed using the
published Geneious workﬂows for preprocessing of NGS reads and assembly of
SARS-CoV-2 amplicons42. Paired reads were trimmed, and the adapter sequences
removed with the BBDuk plugin. Trimmed reads were aligned to the SARS-CoV-2
reference genome MN908947. Variants present at frequencies of 1% or above were
called using the Annotate and Predict Find Variations/SNPs in Geneious and
veriﬁed by using the V-PIPE SARS-CoV-2 application43.
Reads from iSeq and MiSeq sequencing were processed as previously
described8. Brieﬂy, VSEARCH tools were used to merge paired reads and
dereplicate sequences44. Dereplicated sequences from RBD amplicons were
respectively mapped to the reference sequence of SARS-CoV-2 (NC_045512.2)
spike ORF using Minimap245. Mapped RBD amplicon sequences were then
processed with SAM Reﬁner using the same spike sequence as a reference and the
command line parameters “--alpha 1.8 --foldab 0.6”. The output from SAM Reﬁner
(available at https://github.com/degregory/Cryptic_WNY_sup/tree/main/
SAM_Reﬁner_outputs) were reviewed to determine the known and novel lineage
makeup of the sampled sewersheds. To verify and visualize the variant alleles,
FreeBayes46 was used to call variants on the mapped reads (https://github.com/
degregory/Cryptic_WNY_sup/tree/main/VCFs) and Integrative Genomics
Viewer47 was used to generate genomic plots (https://github.com/degregory/
Cryptic_WNY_sup/tree/main/IGV).
For sequencing from rRNA templates, dereplicated reads with a minimum
unique count of 10 were mapped with Bowtie248 to a collected reference index of
mitochondrial and rRNA related animal sequences from NCBI’s nucleotide and
refseq databases (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/). Mapped rRNA sequences were
reviewed for matching of speciﬁc organisms. Sequences with poor mapping to
sequences in the index and a random selection of sequences with good mapping
were checked by Blast (https://blast.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/Blast.cgi) to verify the
organism match. Matches were corrected based on the blast results as needed.
For both iSeq and MiSeq datasets, we examined Outbreak.info for the
prevalence of each mutation and their associated lineages in New York, the United
States and worldwide (Supplementary Data 1).
For sequences from GISAID, fasta formatted sequences from NYC patients
were obtained from the GISAID database for submissions between January to April
2021. These sequences were processed similarly to the dereplicated sequences
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above. Minimap2 was used to map the sequences to the spike ORF, then SAM
Reﬁner was used to process the mapped sequences using “--min_count 1
--min_samp_abund 0” parameters to include all variations in the output.
Fastq formatted sequences were obtained for all sequenced SARS-CoV-2
clinical samples from New York state as of July 2, 2021, and all SARS-CoV-2
wastewater samples as of September 15, 2021. Metadata tables for all processed
SRAs are available at https://github.com/degregory/Cryptic_WNY_sup/tree/main/
SRAs. Fastq ﬁles were processed similarly to our iSeq and MiSeq sequencing runs
with the merging step skipped for unpaired reads. Reads mapped to the spike Orf
were processed with SAM Reﬁner with the parameters “--wgs 1 --min_count 1
--min_samp_abund 0”.

Plasmids. Eukaryotic expression vectors for the heavy and light chains of antibodies LY-CoV016, LY-CoV555, and REGN10987 were obtained from Genscript.
The lentiviral reporter constructed containing Gaussia luciferase (Gluc) with a
reverse-intron (HIV-1-GLuc) was previously described49. The codon-optimized
SARS-CoV-2 spike expression vector was obtained from Tom Gallagher50. This
construct was modiﬁed to enhance transduction efﬁciency by truncating the last 19
amino acids and introducing the D614G amino acid change. DNA gBlocks containing the WNY RBD sequences were synthesized by IDT and introduced into the
SARS-CoV-2 expression construct using In-Fusion cloning (Takara Bio, 638943).
Lentiviral Mouse and Rat Ace2 vectors pscALPSpuro-MmACE2 (Mouse) and
pscALPSpuro-RnACE2 (Rat) were obtained from Jeremy Luban51.

Cell culture. The 293FT cell line was obtained from Invitrogen. The 293FT
+TMPRSS2 and 293FT+TMPRSS2 + human Ace2 cells were previously
described52. All cells were maintained in Dulbecco’s modiﬁed Eagle’s medium
(DMEM, Cytiva, SH30022.01) supplemented with 10% fetal bovine serum, 2 mM Lglutamine (Sigma, G751), 1 mM sodium pyruvate (Sigma, S8636), 10 mM nonessential amino acids (Sigma, M7145), and 1% minimal essential medium (MEM)
vitamins (Sigma, M6895). The ACE2 cell lines were generated by transfecting
293FT cells with 500 ng HIV GagPol expression vector, 400 ng of pscALPSpuroMmACE2 (Mouse) or pscALPSpuro-RnACE2 (Rat), and 100 ng of VSV-G
expression vector. Viral medium was used to transduce 293FT+TMPRSS2 cells53,
and cells were selected with puromycin (1 mg/mL) (Sigma, P8833) beginning
2 days postransduction and were maintained until control treated cells were
all eliminated.

Monoclonal antibody synthesis. Transfections of 10 cm dishes of 293FT cells
were performed with 5 μg each of heavy and light chain vectors and 40 μg polyethyleneimine (PEI) (Polysciences, 23966-2)53.

Virus production and infectivity assays. All transfections were performed in
10 cm dishes. 293FT cells were transfected with a total of 9 μg of HIV-1-GLuc, 1 mg
of CMV spike vector, and 40 μg of PEI (Polysciences, 23966-2)53. Supernatants
containing the virus were collected 2 days of post-transfection. Transduction of
ACE2 expressing cells was performed by plating 30,000 cells in 96 well plates and
co-culturing with 50 μL of HIV-1-GLuc/Spike particles. GLuc was measured 2 days
post-transduction. All measurements were taken from distinct samples.

Antibody neutralization assay. Subjects were requested to provide a date of
positive PCR test for SARS-CoV-2 and subsequently had laboratory-based serologic tests to conﬁrm the presence of antibody against SARS-CoV-2 S1 RBD
protein. A total of 10–20 mL of blood was collected from each participant.
The plasma was then separated from the blood cells by centrifugation and stored
at −80 °C.

Pseudovirus neutralization assay. All human plasma samples were heat inactivated for 30 min at 56 °C prior to the assay. Samples were diluted at 2-fold in ten
serial dilutions in duplicates. Serially diluted samples were incubated with pretitrated amounts of indicated pseudovirus at 37 °C for 1 h before addition of
293FT cells expressing human ACE2 and TMPRSS2 at 30,000 cells per well. Cells
were incubated for 2 days and then the supernatant was used to measure Gaussia
luciferase (RLU). All measurements were taken from distinct samples. Infection
was normalized to the wells infected with pseudovirus alone.

Statistical analysis. Data and statistical analyses were performed in GraphPad
Prism 9.0. A two-way ANOVA was performed to analyze the effect of receptor type
and virus genotype on Gaussia luciferase intensity. Neutralization IC50 titers were
calculated using nonlinear regression (inhibitor vs. normalized response—variable
slope). Non-parametric pairwise analysis for neutralization titers were performed
by Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed rank test.

NATURE COMMUNICATIONS | (2022)13:635 | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-022-28246-3 | www.nature.com/naturecommunications

7

ARTICLE

NATURE COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-022-28246-3

Reporting summary. Further information on research design is available in the Nature
Research Reporting Summary linked to this article.

Data availability
Source data are provided with this paper. Raw sequencing reads are available in NCBI’s
Sequence Read Archive (SRA) under accession # PRJNA715712. Source data are
provided with this paper.
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